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Supply Chain Commitment Contract Model Based on Uncertainty Theory with Information Updating and Effort Level

International Journal of Management Science
Vol.2 , No. 6, Publication Date: Dec. 11, 2015, Page: 98-111

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Authors

[1]	Cui Yuquan, Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China.
[2]	Lu Xi, Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China.
[3]	Zhang Xiaolin, Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, China.

Abstract

Based on the uncertainty theory, market demand information updating as the background, this paper study the coordination and optimization problem of a two-stage three-phase supply chain system with two wholesalers and a manufacturer. With assumption that semi-symmetric market information and risk-neutral participants, in the situation that the manufacturer and two wholesalers have two pre-season decision-making opportunities and retailers can replenish in the sales season, this paper brings in the supply contract commitments. To exchange updating information of the market that the manufacturer itself can’t obtain directly, the manufacturer will commit to the wholesaler the minimum supply in the pre-season. However, to have more replenishment inventory, wholesalers will exaggerate market updates to a certain extent. And they have competition relationship or mutually reinforcing relationship with the level of effort. According to this contract, we establish the optimization model, and get the optimal strategy of supply chain members by analyzing the supply chain system. Finally, by giving a numerical example, the conclusions are more reasonable.

Keywords

The Uncertainty Theory, Supply Chain, Commitment Contract, Information Updates, Effort Level

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